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2 August 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: A. W. Marshall

SUBJECT: Key Intelligence Questions

REFERENCES: a. Your Memo, Same Subject, dated  
July 27, 1973  
b. Your Memo, Same Subject, dated  
August 1, 1973

1. The order of march as recommended to the DCI is as follows:

- The IC Staff will make informal contact with producers and users to refine the key intelligence question list.
- In consultation with DCI, list will be reduced to those he himself considers key.
- The list will be forwarded to USIB as substantive objectives in August.
- List will be forwarded through NSCIC Working Group to NSCIC for comments on questions posed and any additional recommended questions.

2. Ideally, we would have gotten our list of questions from NSCIC in the first place. We considered going this route but rejected it in the interest of time. In our view, the DCI needs to get his NIO/USIB committee structure working on important problems as soon as possible. I envisage at least a six-week delay in coordinating a series of questions through the Working Group and the NSCIC.

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3. I think it is reasonable to hope that such a specific list of key questions will evoke new interest by the NSCIC principals in the process. Further, I am sure you will note that the addressing of this type of guidance to the community correlates well with our effort to insure the user dominance of the Working Group.

4. With regard to the relationship between such specific questions and the producer analyses which are necessary, I regard the eliciting of specific questions as an essential first step. I see the broad analysis solution evolving in this way: Certain questions posed along with the answers given to them will illustrate the need for producer in-depth analysis. The establishment of the Political Research Office in Proctor's shop will create the mechanism for undertaking many of these studies. I have no doubt that many of the current staff people from ONE/BNE will find their way into that shop, where their talents can be used in analysis rather than in bureaucratic infighting in the current estimates coordination process. Thus, I see the NIO/USIB committee structure providing the means to do those analyses in which you have shown great and proper interest.

5. Our other effort in the current and crisis reporting field also bears on the in-depth analysis problem. There are 500-odd analysts of high quality in the community devoted to getting out current intelligence "newspapers". This dedication of resources is way out of balance with results achieved. If we can get over the bureaucratic hurdles, a good deal of this talent can be directed toward more meaningful analytical efforts. IC Staff has broken the crust of this problem, but we have a long way to go before we can impact heavily on the total current intelligence production effort.

6. Despite the ground to be covered, I think we can begin to prepare right now for a program designed to produce those in-depth studies in which you have shown interest. I would be interested in your views as to how to go about setting up such a program, i.e., subjects, terms of reference, and schedules. I would hope that this could be done by users rather than becoming an intelligence community program self-imposed.

7. With one or two exceptions, the list of topics in your memorandum of August 1 falls into the broader analysis category in my view. They require studies rather than specific substantive answers based on specific evidence in hand. One good approach

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might be to take advantage of the new NIAM art form to tackle these. As the DCI sees it now, a request for an NIAM would be levied on the appropriate NIO who would task individual producers or a joint group and oversee the process. My approach would be to flesh out these topics with at least broad terms of reference in the NSCIC arena and lay the job on the new community apparatus.

8. As a further note on your observations about the undue community concentration on military-technical matters to the detriment of getting at underlying causative factors, I see our current process-oriented efforts as key steps. Much of the heavy emphasis on military-technical matters stems from the fact that there is fierce and endemic competition in the total community for a predominant voice. There is no proper discretion in this competition between military-technical matters of importance to national decisions and those of mere interest at national level, important only to DOD. In this competition more talent is consumed in gamesmanship and protecting positions than in actual analysis and production. If, through the identification of the specific military-technical issues truly important to national level decisions and the establishment of a specific community channel for their resolution, we can put some reasonable bounds on the competition, we will be well down the road to getting proper attention paid to the broader issues.

SIGNED

Daniel O. Graham  
Major General, USA

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